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Book Review
Michael Graetz and Linda Greenhouse, The Burger Court and the Rise of the Judicial 
Right, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2016, pp. 480, $30.00 (cloth)
Reviewed by Alan B. Morrison
The Burger Court and the Rise of the Judicial Right is very upfront about its thesis—
in its introduction, its conclusion, and in each of the fi ve parts dealing with 
a signifi cant area of the Supreme Court’s work during the Burger Court era. 
The authors note that the Burger Court was “often depicted as simply having 
occupied a transitional role,” but that the authors’ goal was “to off er a diff erent 
view,” namely that “a great deal happened during the Burger Court” (7). In 
their view, much of what the Burger Court did either undermined what the 
Warren Court did or refused to take what looked like the logical next step 
needed to carry out the Warren Court’s changes. Here is how the authors put 
it in their conclusion:
Equality took a backseat to other values: to the prerogatives of states and 
localities within the federal system, to the preservation of elite institutions, 
to the effi  ciency of the criminal justice system, to the interests of business, 
and, above all, to rolling back the rights revolution the Warren Court had 
unleashed (341).1
This review will mainly address the question of whether that judgment and 
other similar ones in each chapter are supported by an analysis of the relevant 
cases. The focus is on the main cases discussed in the fi ve subject areas chosen—
criminal law, race, social transformation, business, and the presidency. It will 
also consider some Burger Court cases that are not discussed in the book, as 
well as some from the Warren Court that remain strong. But fi rst a few words 
about the authors and then a brief discussion of which Justices constituted the 
“Burger Court.”
1. The press release for the book describes it this way: “Though traditionally described as a 
moderate or transitional court, the authors demonstrate that the Burger Court was actually a 
conservative one whose constitutional decisions still impact the political landscape in which 
we live today.” https://www.law.yale.edu/yls-today/news/graetz-and-greenhouse-publish-
book-burger-court [https://perma.cc/6RNK-FTD8].
Journal of Legal Education, Volume 66, Number 3 (Spring 2017)
Alan B. Morrison is the Lerner Family Associate Dean for Public Interest & Public Service Law 
at George Washington University Law School. As indicated in some of the note materials, he was 
counsel in several of the cases discussed in The Burger Court, as well as several noted in this review 
that were not discussed. By way of full disclosure: He has known and been a friend to Linda 
Greenhouse and her husband, Gene Fidell, almost since she began to cover the Court.
654 Journal of Legal Education
“Linda Greenhouse is the Knight Distinguished Journalist in Residence 
and Joseph Goldstein Lecturer in Law at Yale Law School. She covered 
the Supreme Court for The New York Times between 1978 and 2008 and writes 
a biweekly op-ed column on law as a contributing columnist.”2 Not a lawyer, 
Greenhouse earned a Master in Studies of Law degree from Yale. With her 
co-author Michael Graetz, she teaches a course at Yale titled “Warren Burger’s 
Supreme Court.” Professor Graetz, who currently teaches at Columbia Law 
School, taught at Yale for nearly twenty-fi ve years. His Columbia biography 
describes him as “a leading expert on national and international tax law,” 
which has been the focus of his teaching and writing.3 
The book defi nes the Burger Court as the seventeen years in which Warren 
Burger was Chief Justice of the United States, 1969-1986. During that time there 
was both continuity—Justices William Brennan, Byron White, and Thurgood 
Marshall (who was not really part of the Warren Court, having come on in 
1967) were there from start to fi nish—and departures and new arrivals. The 
biggest change took place between June 1970 and January 1972, when Justices 
Harry Blackmun, fi rst, and then Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist joined 
the Chief Justice. Justice William Douglas retired in December 1975 and was 
promptly replaced by Justice John Paul Stevens. The only other change took 
place in 1981, when Justice Potter Stewart retired and Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor took his place (355). It is this Court that is pictured on the cover 
and is the main focus of the book. Finally, although perhaps unnecessary for 
readers of this journal, the fact that there is agreement among Justices on one 
or even many issues does not guarantee that they will go along on everything, 
which softens the concept of a “Burger Court,” at least at the margins.4
Crime
As the book relates, getting tough on crime was a theme for Richard Nixon 
when he ran for President in 1968 and for Warren Burger when he was a 
circuit court judge (13-14). This section fi rst discusses the death penalty cases, 
followed by three sets of Warren Court rulings that sparked opposition—the 
exclusionary rule, the right to counsel, and the required warnings for those 
in custody. It then turns to the substantially increased availability of federal 
habeas corpus under the Warren Court as a means by which defendants could 
collaterally attack their state court convictions, an issue that was not on the 
radar of the average citizen, but was very much a concern to prosecutors and 
other state and local offi  cials. The authors assess the Burger Court’s overall 
2. Linda Greehouse, YALE L. SCH., https://www.law.yale.edu/linda-greenhouse [https://perma.
cc/J3TK-A5E2] (last visited Oct. 26, 2016).
3. Michael J. Graetz, COLUM. L. SCH., http://www.law.columbia.edu/fac/Michael_Graetz 
[https://perma.cc/G66Q-HSDQ] (last visited Oct. 26, 2016).
4. The book contains a few nods to those not familiar with the Court and legal doctrine—the 
note on Supreme Court Procedure (pp. 9-10) and the translation of stare decisis (p.22)—but 
in the main, it is a book written for lawyers, perhaps even that subset whose practices or 
teaching focuses on the Supreme Court.
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performance on these issues this way: It “dramatically diminished the scope 
and impact of the Warren Court’s precedents: they survived, but only their 
facade was left standing.” (15).
No doubt to the surprise of some who are not close students of the Court, it 
was the Burger Court, and not the Warren Court, that held the death penalty 
unconstitutional, by a 5-4 vote in 1972 in Furman v. Georgia.5 Nine separate 
opinions were issued, and the holding was a narrow one: The current death 
sentences involving 600 defendants cannot stand because in certain respects 
the imposition of the death penalty violated the Constitution. Five years later, 
after states had revised their death penalty statutes in an eff ort to conform to 
the Court’s message, the Court confi rmed in Gregg v. Georgia6 that the death 
penalty was still alive in some of its applications, but held the laws of Louisiana 
and North Carolina, which mandated the death penalty in certain categories 
of cases, violated the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment in the 
Eighth Amendment (26).
Given the narrow margin in Furman, the Burger Court could have sought 
to reverse Furman and hold that there are no Eighth Amendment limits on 
whether, under what circumstances, and how states may decide on the use of 
the death penalty. But it did not. Indeed, as the book points out, although 
the Court declined many opportunities to apply Furman to slightly diff erent 
situations, it nonetheless mandated individual death penalty determinations, 
in which defendants are allowed to introduce all arguable mitigating factors 
(as are prosecutors for aggravators) (28). It also stopped the use of the death 
penalty for crimes that did not result in death, including reversing the penalty 
for rape of an adult and murder committed by another in the course of an armed 
robbery, at least without allowing testimony as to the defendant’s limited role 
in the crime (29-32). The chapter also has a very useful summary of death 
penalty litigation while Warren Burger was Chief Justice and thereafter. In 
the end, surely no rollback and some positive developments for death penalty 
opponents occurred even while Burger was the Chief Justice. Then again, the 
authors’ conclusion—that the Burger Court’s death penalty decisions did not 
actually remedy the infi rmities identifi ed in Furman, nor have they managed to 
reliably separate out “those who ‘deserve to die’ from those who do not”—is 
surely correct (36).
The introduction to Chapter 2, “Taming the Trilogy,” asserts that the 
Burger Court “constricted greatly” the rights of criminal defendants and that, 
while “[m]ost observers had expected the Burger Court to overrule the major 
criminal procedure decisions of the Warren Court,” it did not, but instead 
“eviscerated them.” (43). The chapter focuses on Miranda warnings, the right 
to counsel, and the exclusionary rule, and surely makes the case that, at 
almost every opportunity, the Burger Court refused to extend them or created 
exceptions that diminished the eff ectiveness of prior rulings. But whether those 
5. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
6. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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rights were “eviscerated” is a matter of judgment. The police still give Miranda 
warnings every day, and some suspects and/or their lawyers take advantage 
of them. Indeed, as the book points out, the Court had an opportunity to 
overrule Miranda, but then Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 7-2 decision for the Court 
declined to do so (44-45).
On the right to counsel, the Court has been very stingy in extending it 
and has found it to be inapplicable in a number of situations, often having 
to do with whether the accused was “in custody.” The authors are also plainly 
correct that the right to counsel should include the right to eff ective assistance 
of counsel, and the Burger Court in Strickland v. Washington7 set the bar for 
ineff ectiveness at such a diffi  cult level that almost no defendants can prevail on 
that claim. But almost none does not equal zero, and so even Strickland (which 
was not a Warren Court decision) provides some protection to the accused in 
some cases. Perhaps more important, no Burger Court ruling has suggested, 
let alone held, that we should revert to the days when there was no right to 
counsel in felony cases and before the right was extended to anyone whose 
term of imprisonment could exceed six months.
The Burger Court record on the exclusionary rule is also one of new exceptions 
and refusals to take the next step in protecting defendants. But the rule is still 
honored as law enforcement offi  cials now regularly obtain the necessary search 
warrants and try to follow the strictures of the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, 
almost every term the Court faces Fourth Amendment issues that would 
vanish if the exclusionary rule did not exist. Again, like Miranda warnings, it is 
a rule with which the police can live, if not love, and it now protects all of us 
from invasions of privacy of the kind that could not have been contemplated 
when the rule was created, as evidenced by two unanimous decisions of the 
Roberts Court: United States v. Jones8 (unconstitutional to attach tracking device 
for 30 days to a suspect’s automobile without a warrant) and Riley v. California9 
(warrantless search of a cell phone violates the Fourth Amendment). To be 
sure, the exclusionary rule was less vigorous in the Burger Court, but it seems 
too harsh of the authors to conclude that it was “so circumscribed . . . as to 
render it virtually impotent.” (49).
Any book that attempts to summarize the work of the Supreme Court 
over any time frame can always be faulted for not discussing a case, but in 
this instance, given the very negative assessment of the Burger Court and 
its eff orts to “eviscerate” the Warren Court’s criminal procedure rulings, the 
failure to discuss what happened, or did not happen, to the seminal ruling in 
Brady v. Maryland10 is signifi cant. In Brady, the Court established an affi  rmative 
obligation of prosecutors to produce for the defendant any favorable evidence 
in its possession or that of other law enforcement agencies with which they 
7. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
8. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
9. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
10. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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are working on the case. To my knowledge, no opinion of the Court, under 
any Chief Justice, has sought to overturn that basic due process principle, 
although the problems that Brady identifi ed still persist.11 While the due process 
principle has not always been applied as generously as defendants would like, 
or principles of fi nality (discussed below) precluded them from raising it, it 
continues to provide an important protection for the innocent and probably 
deserved at least a mention as an example of what the Burger Court did not 
try to eviscerate.
The third part of the discussion of the criminal procedure rulings of the 
Burger Court is, to my mind, the least controversial and, in many ways, the 
most convincing. “Closing the Federal Courthouse Doors” focuses mainly on 
the limits that were placed on the use of federal habeas corpus to challenge 
state court convictions. Here the Court, sailing under the banner of federalism, 
actually overruled precedents and erected a series of barriers that made it much 
more diffi  cult, and in many cases impossible, for a defendant to have a federal 
court reach the merits of his constitutional claims. The authors’ fi nal thoughts 
on the Burger Court’s rulings in criminal law matters are surely on target 
regarding the availability of habeas corpus: “The Burger Court was far more 
willing than its predecessor to rely on the good faith of law enforcement offi  cers 
and state prosecutors and to rely on the fairness of state adjudications.”(75).
That observation also explains many of the other Burger Court rulings in 
the area of crime, but readers will have to judge for themselves whether that 
is the whole story of what the Burger Court did and did not do in this area. 
Fortunately, the book provides the relevant facts of the cases and the necessary 
background to enable the reader to make an informed judgment.
Race
The next part deals with race and considers public schools fi rst and then 
universities, with employment discussed in Chapter 11. It is hard to dispute 
the authors’ assertion that “[a] half century after Brown, our nation still suff ers 
dramatic racial disparities of wealth, income, education, employment, health, 
and incarceration.” (78). The question raised by this part is whether the Burger 
Court is accountable for many of those disparities because of what it did or 
did not do in the area of education. The authors make the case that the path 
to further integration was surely not aided by the Burger Court, but there is 
no claim that the Justices tried to overrule Brown or to create exceptions to it. 
Rather, their point is that the Burger Court had opportunities to advance the 
progress that the Warren Court started, but did not do so.
The fi rst question that the Burger Court tackled was busing. Initially, it 
supported the concept, but drew the line when the remedy required inter-
district busing because of de facto racial segregation in housing within school 
11. In his oft-cited dissent from denial of rehearing en banc in United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 
626 (9th Cir. 2013), then Chief Judge Alex Kozinski concludes that “[t]here is an epidemic 
of Brady violations abroad in the land. Only judges can put a stop to it.” His opinion went 
on to cite many recent examples, which included the case before him. Id. at 631–32.
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districts. The book also points out that busing was a remedy that extended 
into the North and that produced very diff erent reactions from Brown, which 
only forbade segregation under law, primarily in the South. The opposition 
to busing was led by Justice Powell, a longtime member of the Virginia and 
Richmond school boards (84). As the authors put it, “the values that Powell 
held most dear exalted neighborhood schools and abhorred any sacrifi ce of 
quality education by whites in pursuit of desegregation.” (89). The issue of 
busing never reached the Warren Court, and so we have no way of knowing 
how it would have reacted, but we do know that if busing is or were the 
key to further desegregation, the Burger Court stopped it from having any 
meaningful eff ect.
The Burger Court’s other major school case was San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez,12 in which the plaintiff s challenged the great disparities in 
resources between the best- and worst-funded school districts, largely because 
the money for schools in Texas was raised by each locality. The issue was 
whether the diff erences in wealth should be subject to heightened scrutiny 
of some kind, and the Court said no, thereby sustaining the existing regime. 
Again, the issue was new, and so no Warren Court precedents were at stake. 
The plaintiff s had very sympathetic facts, but it was by no means clear what 
the limits of their wealth-based argument would be, in the context of schools 
or elsewhere. Indeed, some state courts have used this approach to re-balance 
the funding of their schools,13 but whether they have succeeded in improving 
the quality of education for all students is at least debatable. In this instance, 
the authors’ judgment seems unduly harsh: “Rodriguez eviscerated the most 
promising alternative avenue for claims based on racial discrimination. Finally, 
by consigning the right of public education to the constitutional dustbin, the 
Court constricted the minimal requirements of our Constitution’s guarantee 
of liberty and justice for all.” (93).
In their conclusion to the public school chapter, the authors acknowledge 
that the Burger Court did not seek to limit the impact of Brown, at least not 
directly (102). They then observe that despite the end of “separate but equal,” 
our public schools “remain starkly separate and grossly unequal,” and “Warren 
Burger’s Supreme Court must take much of the responsibility for that.” (102).14 
Again, the authors provide the evidence, and the reader is left to decide 
whether “much” in this assessment is too much, too little, or just about right.
Chapter 5 considers how affi  rmative action, or reverse discrimination, 
as it came to be known, fared in higher education in the Burger Court. In 
the fi rst case discussed, Marco DeFunis, a white male, sued the University 
of Washington Law School, claiming that minority applicants less qualifi ed 
than he were granted admission, while he was not. The evidence showed that 
there were separate applicant pools for minorities in which less emphasis was 
12. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
13. See e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971).
14. Emphasis added.
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given to scores and grades. After DeFunis had twice been denied admission, 
while the school admitted 37 minority applicants who would not have been 
admitted under the normal criteria, he sued. The state trial court agreed with 
DeFunis; it therefore ordered his admission. The university complied, but also 
appealed. The state Supreme Court reversed, and the Burger Court agreed to 
hear the case, even though no confl ict existed in the lower courts on this issue, 
which was then one of fi rst impression (103-04).
DeFunis was allowed to continue his law studies while the case proceeded to 
oral argument. But instead of ruling on the merits, the Court decided to dismiss 
the case as moot, presumably because the only remedy that was available to 
the state would have been to ask the Court to deny DeFunis his diploma at 
his scheduled graduation a few weeks away.15 What is most interesting about 
the DeFunis case for this book is that Justice Douglas dissented because he 
believed that DeFunis was entitled to have his application considered on the 
merits in a racially neutral manner (105). This at least suggests that treating 
applicants separately based on race, as the law school did for DeFunis, might 
not have passed muster in some circumstances even in the Warren Court.16
The book then discusses the violence accompanying eff orts to integrate 
universities, followed by the progress that was made before DeFunis, although 
why the authors chose to reverse the order of history is unclear (106-14). 
Whatever relief the Court felt from the DeFunis dismissal was short-lived 
when Allan Bakke sued two months later for being denied admission to the 
University of California Davis Medical School (as well as ten other schools). 
He largely prevailed in the trial court and won the right to be admitted by the 
California Supreme Court, which was hardly a bastion of conservatism in the 
1970s. Based on the papers of several of the Justices that are now available, 
the book relates how the Burger Court was divided 5-4 on granting review, 
with Brennan and Marshall opposing for fear of what the case would do to all 
affi  rmative action, and Burger and Blackmun agreeing for their own reasons. 
But Justice Stevens, who by then had replaced Justice Douglas, agreed with 
the other four to hear the case, and so review was granted (116).
Like many other parts of The Burger Court, the ins and outs of how the Court 
reached its decision are very much worth the read, even for those familiar with 
the compromise decision based on Justice Powell’s opinion (114-22). In the 
end, the Court preserved the possibility of affi  rmative action in the name of 
promoting diversity in higher education, but barred the use of quotas.17 In 
the concluding pages of this chapter, the authors recognize the diffi  culty of 
15. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
16. The dismissal on mootness grounds in DeFunis contrasts sharply with the willingness of the 
Roberts Court to consider the merits not once, but twice, in Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 136 S.Ct. 
2198 (2016), and 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013), even though the applicant had graduated from another 
university and her only claim was one for money damages, mainly her $100 application fee. 
Among lawyers who regularly have to deal with the implications of DeFunis, the case is often 
described as standing for the doctrine of “If it’s very hard, it’s moot.”
17. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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achieving consensus regarding the role of race in university admissions and 
agree that the issue would not have disappeared no matter how the Court 
came out. But the authors fi nd fault with the Court’s focus on diversity on 
the ground that the decision “essentially disabled minority applicants from 
advancing any legal claim (in the absence of intentional discrimination, of 
course) [while] it simultaneously allowed disappointed white applicants to 
claim that their rejection was illegal because it was based on race.” (127). After 
noting that the Court did not “slam the door on minorities’ opportunities 
when the nation’s colleges and universities voluntarily undertook to provide 
them . . . it bestowed on future courts a basis for eliminating affi  rmative action 
altogether.” (128). Once again, the authors accurately state the facts as of 2015, 
but describe them in a way that assigns responsibility to the Burger Court for 
unleashing lawsuits based on claims of reverse discrimination, even while they 
agree that forces in society at large were pushing, and continued to push, in 
that direction.18
The Remaining Chapters
Because this is a book review, not a summary of a book that I would have 
written if I had undertaken this endeavor, I will not examine the remaining 
eight chapters as I did the fi rst fi ve. Instead, I will highlight some of their 
many insights and point out a few places where the judgments of the authors 
may be subject to some marginal debate.
In the “Privacy at a Price” chapter, the authors nicely capture the Burger 
Court’s treatment of abortion. The Court did, after all, venture into territory 
from which the Warren Court stayed away, and when it ruled, it did so with a 
resounding 7-2 decision, with one of the dissenters, Justice White, a Warren 
Court holdover. But as this chapter explains, the ruling came with a price, 
or actually two. The fi rst, which came to the fore with Justice O’Connor’s 
dissenting opinion in the Akron case, introduced the concept of “undue 
burden.” (153). That approach eventually gave courts and legislatures some 
room to argue that as long as abortions continued to be legally available, some 
conditions could be attached to obtaining them. Subsequent cases upheld 
some laws and struck down others, but the basic right remained intact. Indeed, 
in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,19 a law requiring that those operating 
abortion clinics have nearby hospital admitting privileges and that the clinics 
themselves be substantially upgraded (at very signifi cant cost) was held to 
amount to a constitutionally excessive burden. The very fact-intensive opinion 
strengthened the ability of women to obtain abortions, while underscoring the 
18. There is some irony in their conclusion that the Roberts Court is likely to end affi  rmative 
action entirely when, in the second Fisher decision, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016), Justice Anthony 
Kennedy sided with the University of Texas and upheld its race-conscious admissions plan. 
Further, with the death of Justice Antonin Scalia while Fisher was pending, and the fact that 
Justice Elena Kagan was recused in Fisher but not in future affi  rmative action cases, the fate 
of those programs seems much less precarious than when the book went to press.
19. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
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reality that these cases will, at least for now, continue to be fought on a statute-
by-statute basis.
The second condition is far more troublesome: It allows the federal 
government to refuse to pay for abortions for women on Medicaid, making the 
“right” to an abortion depend on wealth. The authors adroitly tie in this price 
with the Court’s prior ruling in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,20 
in which the Court refused to intervene to achieve fi nancial equality in Texas 
schools. This is how Justice Stewart explained the Court’s refusal to overrule 
the limitation on funding abortions to those that are medically necessary: “The 
fi nancial constraints that restrict an indigent woman’s ability to enjoy the full 
range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice are the product not of 
government restrictions on access to abortions, but rather of her indigency.” 
(160).21 I agree with the dissenters that the law was not about saving money, 
but about punishing women who could not aff ord an abortion. Nonetheless, 
the authors’ conclusion that “This was Warren Burger’s Constitution in the 
raw” (160) seems a little excessive.
On the subject of women’s rights in Chapter 6, the book gives the Burger 
Court full credit for producing the most expansive defi nition of sex equality 
that the country had ever known: “The Warren Court, for all its activism 
and broad vision of constitutional rights, had been deaf to the claim that the 
Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection had anything to do with women.” 
(163). The chapter retells of the eff orts to impose strict scrutiny on gender-
based laws, which ended up with a form of intermediate scrutiny that is almost 
as powerful as strict scrutiny. It is mildly critical of the Court for failing to see 
laws treating pregnancy as being diff erent from other discrimination based 
on gender. However, Congress eliminated that problem with the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act in the days when Congress could be counted on to fi x 
statutory construction errors made by the Court.
In “Expression and Repression,” the book discusses the Court’s ups 
and downs in trying to regulate obscenity, an exercise that will surely seem 
bizarre today in the face of the ready availability of hard-core pornography 
on the Internet and elsewhere. The most interesting part of this section is 
the discussion of the same-sex sodomy cases, culminating in the 5-4 decision 
upholding Georgia’s law criminalizing the practice.22 Like so many other parts 
of the book, the authors use the Justices’ papers to great advantage to fi ll in 
background points not found in the U.S. Reports, the briefs, or transcripts of the 
oral arguments. Their conclusion that Bowers “was a devastating blow to the 
gay rights movement” (210) was surely right at the time, but as they point out, 
that loss was reversed seventeen years later in Lawrence v. Texas.23 Now not only 
20. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
21. Quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980).
22. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
23. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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have sodomy laws disappeared, but gays and lesbians have the constitutional 
right to marry their same-sex partners.24
The chapter on religion is framed around the sometimes-overlooked fact 
that the religion clauses of the First Amendment contain both a right to free 
exercise of religion and a prohibition against the establishment of religion, 
with the two rights often in tension. The authors observe that the Burger Court 
tended to favor free exercise and had less enthusiasm for expanding the anti-
establishment portion than its predecessor (especially by opening the door to 
state aid to religious schools for secular purposes). Even so, overall the Burger 
Court did not tip the balance too far in that direction. And the authors also 
rightly praised the Court for rejecting the contention of Bob Jones University 
that it had a constitutional right to enforce its views on separating black and 
white students in the name of free exercise while maintaining its tax-exempt 
status under the Internal Revenue Code, even with the Reagan administration 
partly siding with the university (221).
The next part covers how businesses fared in the Court under Warren 
Burger.  Much of the six-page summary is devoted to the memorandum that 
Justice Powell did for leaders of the business community, just two months 
before he was nominated. That was before the days when confi rmation hearings 
explored in depth everything the nominee had ever said or written; in this 
case neither the FBI nor anyone who might have been concerned by its very 
strong pro-business position discovered it until almost a year after Powell was 
confi rmed, when it was revealed by columnist Jack Anderson. Given Powell’s 
background, his general attitudes should not have been a surprise, but his 
focus on specifi c individuals, including my boss Ralph Nader, was somewhat 
of a shock. As this part shows, Powell was a strong voice for business on the 
Court, but he did not always toe the line.25
Much of the chapter “Corporations Are People” is devoted to the 
development of the commercial speech doctrine and to showing how the 
ruling in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.26 is 
mainly a pro-business decision. As the lawyer for the plaintiff s who challenged 
that law, which forbade pharmacists from advertising the price of prescription 
drugs, I saw the decision as a victory for consumers and for those pharmacies 
that wanted to compete over prices. As I have detailed elsewhere,27 the Virginia 
Board of Pharmacy case, and our offi  ce’s prior amicus participation in another case 
24. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
25. I was co-counsel for Ralph Nader when the Court granted review in his dispute with 
Allegheny Airlines for its failure to disclose its intentional overbooking practice.  We 
considered moving to recuse Justice Powell based on the memo, but decided against it. 
In the end, Powell surprised us by writing the opinion unanimously ruling in favor of Mr. 
Nader. Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290 (1976).
26. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
27. Alan B. Morrison, How We Got the Commercial Speech Doctrine: An Originalist’s Recollections, 54 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 1189 (2004).
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discussed in the book, Bigelow v. Virginia,28 whose rationale led directly to the 
result in Virginia Pharmacy, were part of an overall strategy. Our goal was to 
enable consumers to obtain access to useful information in the marketplace, 
including ending the total ban on advertising by lawyers. To be sure, the 
Burger Court’s subsequent ruling in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public 
Service Commission29 opened up avenues for businesses to both advertise and 
make other commercial speech claims not previously available. Even so, 
without the commercial speech doctrine, consumers would have remained in 
the dark about important information aff ecting them. My judgment may not 
be entirely without bias, but these commercial speech decisions were, by and 
large, a win for both businesses that want to compete and the public.30
The fi nal discussion in this chapter focuses on First National Bank of Boston v. 
Bellotti,31 which was the forerunner, at least in the eyes of the Roberts Court, to 
Citizens United v. FEC.32 The law at issue in Bellotti prohibited corporations from 
spending money supporting or opposing ballot initiatives. Unlike the federal 
law, which applies equally to corporations and unions, the ban in Bellotti ran 
only against the former. In addition, various other forms of businesses, such 
as real estate trusts, were exempt, for no apparent reason. Furthermore, the 
plaintiff  was not spending money on a general election or a proposal unrelated 
to its business: In this case the initiative would have imposed a graduated 
personal income tax on the plaintiff ’s shareholders, and all it wanted was a 
right to be heard in opposition. The Court could easily have decided the case 
on equal protection grounds, using heightened scrutiny because of the First 
Amendment interest in the political speech at issue, but it did not, over the 
dissents of Justice Rehnquist and of Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan 
and Marshall. The Court did, however, include a footnote recognizing that 
contributions to candidates were a diff erent matter;33 but that did not stop 
the Roberts Court thirty-two years later from applying Bellotti to enable 
corporations to make unlimited independent expenditures in federal or state 
candidate elections.34
Before discussing Bellotti, the authors analyze the Burger Court’s seminal 
decision in Buckley v. Valeo.35 The decision to include Buckley in a chapter on 
corporations is a curious one, since no business corporation was a plaintiff  
28. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
29. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
30. See Alan B. Morrison, No Regrets (Almost): After Virginia Board of Pharmacy, 58 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. (forthcoming 2017).
31. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
32. In contrast to the discussion of most of the cases, the authors did not discuss a number of 
the facts in Bellotti noted in the text.
33. 435 U.S. at 787 n.26.
34. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
35. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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in that case.  Nor does the discussion of part of the ruling in Buckley—that 
there can be no dollar limits on independent expenditures by individuals 
in elections for offi  ce—connect it to the later decision in Citizens United that 
brought corporations within that holding. Instead, the Court made the 
connection to Bellotti, which sought unsuccessfully to distinguish ballot issues 
from candidate elections. But as I have argued elsewhere,36 the real culprit is 
Buckley, in which the Court issued a far broader ruling than necessary to strike 
down the $1000 limit on independent expenditures per candidate for anyone, 
when direct contributions of $2000 per election cycle could be made to the 
candidate.  Instead of holding that $1000 was unreasonably low in light of 
the First Amendment rights at stake, and leaving other amounts for another 
day, the majority saw the independent expenditure limit as the same as the 
provision setting a ceiling on how much a candidate could spend from money 
lawfully raised. Then, once there was no limit on what individuals can spend 
on independent expenditures, it was much harder to justify an absolute ban on 
corporations making those expenditures, unless one concluded that corporate 
spending in elections was not governed by the same rules—a position that the 
Citizens United majority fi rmly rejected.
The second of the business chapters is titled “Battling Workplace Inequality,” 
which includes both workers battling companies and discrimination against 
classes of workers (other than women, who were covered in Chapter 7). It 
is both hard to quarrel with the conclusion and quite expected that Justices 
appointed by Republican Presidents would favor companies against unions, 
which is what happened under Warren Burger in matters coming from the 
National Labor Relations Board. As the authors note, “The Burger Court 
decided hundreds of cases concerning employees’ complaints of disadvantages 
in their workplace. In the most important confl icts between businesses and 
unions, business interests prevailed.” (295).
The record in workplace discrimination was, as the book acknowledges, 
more mixed. The Court’s 1971 decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,37 read Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 not only to include intentional discrimination, 
but also to reach facially neutral requirements—such as attaining a high 
school diploma or passing a general intelligence test. The Court found 
those requirements violated Title VII because they had a negative impact on 
minorities and had no connection to the qualifi cations needed for the job. The 
authors could also have cited McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,38 which set rules 
by which plaintiff s could shift to the company the burden of explaining the 
apparent discrimination by presenting a fairly simple prima facie case. Instead, 
36. Alan B. Morrison, McCutcheon v. FEC and Roberts v. Breyer: They’re Both Right and They’re 
Both Wrong, AM. CONST. SOC’Y (Oct. 15, 2014), https://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/fi les/
Morrison_-_McCutcheon_v._FEC.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9BY-9W25]. 
37. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
38. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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they focus much of their attention on Washington v. Davis,39 the constitutional 
challenge to the District of Columbia’s facially neutral hiring requirements 
for the police. I too disagree with the decision, but to call it “one of the 
Burger Court’s foundational constitutional rulings” (288) widely overstates 
its signifi cance. That is because Title VII had already been extended to state 
and local governments, making the decision largely of academic interest in 
the employment fi eld. The authors also point to the impact of the case in the 
criminal law area, but its citations in notes 129 and 130 of that chapter fall short 
of establishing their conclusion.
The fi nal section covers the presidency. In the fi rst of two chapters, the 
authors deal extensively with the Pentagon Papers case,40 approving of the 
protection aff orded the press, but then pointing to a lack of protection for 
those who leak classifi ed documents, without which the press has no sources 
(302-11). They then turn to the eff orts of the Nixon administration to engage in 
warrantless wiretaps in the name of national security, which the Court properly 
halted (311-318). But the Court was far more protective of the executive when it 
came to providing defenses against civil liability. In another closely divided case 
that the authors discuss, the Court in a 5-4 vote provided absolute immunity 
for all Presidents from all civil liability claims, even those involving violations 
of the wiretap statute, letting former President Richard Nixon off  the hook 
(321). Readers will fi nd that decision to be either very, or just a little, harmful 
depending on whether their main concern is compensation or accountability: 
Presidents never act alone in these matters, and so if the underlings can be 
sued, the harm is greatly diminished. The problem is not so much presidential 
immunity, but the doctrine of qualifi ed immunity for all executive branch 
offi  cials, even for constitutional violations, which the Court upheld by a 
vote of 8-1 on the same day that Nixon received his absolute immunity (322). 
Federal offi  cials had long received qualifi ed immunity when sued for ordinary 
torts, although often the United States is liable under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act. And the Court had off ered similar protection to state and local offi  cials 
when they were sued for damages for constitutional violations. The real crime 
is not just that the offi  cers get off  in these cases, but that the governments that 
employ them are not held responsible, leaving the injured to absorb all the 
costs and pain and suff ering on their own.
Among the most dramatic of Burger Court-era cases was one that involved 
the eff ort of President Nixon to avoid turning over the White House tapes 
to the prosecutor for use in the criminal trial against his former aids. The 
basic story is well-known, but its re-telling here has many nice additions. The 
President had to turn over the tapes, which prompted his resignation, but the 
authors suggest that the Court’s opinion also “strengthened the presidency” 
by recognizing for the fi rst time a privilege of the President to keep his papers 
secret, absent some compelling need of others (338). In this case the documents 
were needed for use in a federal criminal case (and, I would add, the House 
39. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
40. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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Judiciary Committee that was considering whether to impeach the President). 
But even before that formal recognition, Presidents regularly asserted the 
privilege, and no one was in a position to sue to test its validity. Moreover, in 
the subsequent civil case in which Nixon contested the statute in which the 
government repossessed all of the offi  cial papers and tapes that he claimed as 
his own, he raised the same executive privilege objection and the Burger Court 
quite sensibly rejected it.41 Indeed, Congress has since enacted the Presidential 
Materials Act under which the records of all presidents remain government 
records after they leave offi  ce, and become publicly available in the future, 
subject to certain exceptions.42
Every author, especially in a book that seeks to portray the overall impact 
of seventeen years of Supreme Court decisions, has to make choices about 
what to include and what to leave out. One neutral criterion on whether a case 
should be included on the subject of the presidency would be whether the case 
is one that every fi rst-year law student reads in constitutional law. I admit my 
bias on the question because the case I have in mind is INS v. Chadha,43 in which 
I represented Mr. Chadha. The opinion, written by the Chief Justice, struck 
down the legislative veto in more than 200 statutes as a violation of separation 
of powers. The authors include it in the book’s fi nal and very lengthy footnote, 
but not in text. The limited reference is also somewhat strange because Chadha 
would support the chapter’s conclusion that the Burger Court strengthened 
the institution of the presidency, which it did mainly by taking away a potent 
and potentially uncontrollable weapon from Congress. Whether the Burger 
Court rulings that the authors do discuss “insulated [the presidency] in 
important ways from liability and accountability” is one that the readers are in 
the best position to judge.44
Conclusion
The subtitle of the conclusion—“A Lasting Legacy”—makes clear that the 
authors believe that they have established that the Burger Court was far more 
consequential than has been previously considered and greatly contributed 
to “the Rise of the Judicial Right.” As their counterpoint, they rely on a 1986 
speech by Justice Powell to the American Bar Association, a year before he 
stepped down from the Court. The authors contest his “no counterrevolution” 
thesis, instead fi nding his assessment to be “at once both highly selective 
and internally contradictory—a mixed message that draws us down a path to 
a conclusion quite diff erent from his own.” (339). It continues with a point-
41. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs. , 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
42. Presidential Records Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2207.
43. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
44. On page two, the authors report that Chief Justice Earl Warren considered that Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1963), was, with Brown v. Board of Education 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and Gideon 
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the most important case decided when he was the Chief 
Justice. The book does not discuss what happened to Baker in the Burger Court—it survived, 
but was not expanded—while treating the fates of the other two extensively.
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by-point (subject-by-subject) refutation of Powell, largely drawing on the 
conclusions that they reached earlier in the book.
One of the many positive features of The Burger Court is that it stakes out its 
position loud and clear and leaves no room for doubt as to what the authors 
conclude about that Court. In doing so, the authors are careful to set forth the 
facts on which they base their views, enabling the reader to decide whether to 
agree or not. To support their conclusion, the authors provide seventy-eight 
pages of footnotes, which include many citations to the papers of the deceased 
Justices, a feature that adds greatly to making the book of interest even to 
those who are familiar with most of the cases discussed. In the end, while I 
agree that the Burger Court moved our country to the right in several areas 
noted above, I am more dubious about the authors’ conclusions in others, and 
in particular about those that utilize emotional adjectives, adverbs, and, in 
some cases, verbs to make their points.
A Final Thought
I presented this review to my colleagues at a workshop at George Washington 
Law School after I had submitted a near-fi nal draft. Several of them observed 
that part of what I saw as problems with The Burger Court was that the authors 
had taken on the almost impossible task of summarizing seventeen years of 
Court decisions, over fi ve major areas, and trying to fi nd a unifying theme while 
doing so. I agree, and if I were to start this review again, I would surely have 
added that note of caution at the beginning. I would also note that the authors’ 
task was complicated not only by trying to encapsulate the Warren Burger era, 
but also in seeking to compare it with the Earl Warren era. However, life in 
the United States did not stand still for those thirty-three years. In particular, 
signifi cant changes arose in the mix of legal issues and problems facing our 
country that bear heavily on what cases the Court will hear and how they will 
be decided. The authors assigned themselves a very heavy lift, and if they did 
not fully succeed, it is in part because of their ambitious goal.
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